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In R v Jordan, the Supreme Court of Canada adopted a new framework for establishing 
violations of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter. 
It did not, however, adopt a new approach to the remedy applicable thereafter. Since the 1987 
decision R v Rahey, the only remedy for unreasonable delay has been a stay of proceedings. 
This article contends that this “automatic stay rule” must be revisited post-Jordan. It does 
so by conceptualizing Jordan as a shift from an “interest balancing” framework—where 
individual and societal interests are weighed against one another—to a calculus largely 
devoid of interest balancing. The first section of this article contends that, while this shift 
promises a host of practical benefits, the dearth of any interest balancing under either Jordan
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or Rahey results in a reductive section 11(b) regime, which ignores case-by-case variations 
in factors that are plainly relevant to whether a given prosecution ought to be stayed. The 
second section of this article surveys existing interest balancing remedial frameworks under 
the Charter, arguing that the interests removed in Jordan are otherwise considered to be, 
and ought to be re-introduced as, remedial factors. The third section addresses the practical 
effects of the automatic stay rule on Canadian society, accused persons, and section 11(b) 
jurisprudence itself. The fourth proposes that the rationale for the automatic stay rule is both 
problematic and obsolete, necessitating the adoption of a “corrective justice” approach to 
section 11(b) violations. The paper concludes by outlining how the ideal remedial framework 
would function. 
IN R V JORDAN, the Supreme Court of Canada “embark[ed] … on uncharted 
waters” for the second time in twenty-fve years by crafting a new framework for 
establishing unreasonable delay in criminal proceedings under section 11(b) of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.1 Te majority ruled that “the system 
ha[d] lost its way” under the preceding R v Morin framework, perpetuating a 
pervasive “culture of complacency towards delay” in the administration of justice.2 
In an intrepid efort to correct the section 11(b) course, the majority changed tack 
from the fexible Morin framework to one predicated on a simplifed calculus.3 
Te majority suggestively noted, however, that it had not been invited to rethink 
the Court’s approach to remedy, which it charted in the 1987 decision Rahey v 
R, where three concurring decisions held that the only remedy for a violation 
of section 11(b) is a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter (the 
“automatic stay rule”).4 Tis article proposes that Jordan is merely the frst step 
in correcting the section 11(b) course. Canadian courts must now revisit the 
automatic stay rule. 
Part I of this article introduces the concept of “interest balancing,” 
where individual and societal interests are weighed against one another in the 
1. Justice Cromwell cites Justice Sopinka in R v Morin: “Embarking as we did on unchartered 
waters it is not surprising that the course we steered has required, and may require in the 
future, some alteration in its direction to accord with experience.” [1992] 1 SCR 771 at 784 
[Morin] cited in R v Jordan, 2016 SCC 27 at para 145 [Jordan]. See also R v Askov, [1990] 2 
SCR 1199 [Askov]. 
2. Jordan, supra note 1 at paras 29, 40. 
3. Ibid at paras 38, 45-46, 77-81, 92-104. 
4. Ibid at para 35. See also R v Rahey, [1987] 1 SCR 588 [Rahey]. See especially R v Mills,
in which the majority of the Court appears to have ruled that alternative remedies were 
available. [1986] 1 SCR 863 [Mills]. To date, the Court has declined to re-open the issue of 
remedy. See Morin, supra note 1 809. 
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determination of an appropriate remedy.5 By largely removing interest balancing 
from the section 11(b) analysis, the simplifed Jordan framework presents a real 
promise of faster trials more frequently; however, the paucity of interest balancing 
under either Jordan or Rahey results in a reductive section 11(b) regime. Part 
II surveys existing interest balancing remedial frameworks, demonstrating that 
the factors excised from the section 11(b) analysis in Jordan are frequently 
considered relevant to the determination of an appropriate remedy for violations 
of the Charter’s other legal rights. Part III addresses the practical efects of the 
automatic stay rule on Canadian society, accused persons, and section 11(b) 
jurisprudence itself. Part IV proposes that the rationale for the automatic stay 
rule is both problematic and obsolete, necessitating the adoption of a “corrective 
justice” approach to section 11(b) violations. Part V outlines how such a remedial 
framework should function and briefy discusses the ancillary benefts of this 
proposed regime. 
I. THE COURSE PARTIALLY CORRECTED: THE REMOVAL OF 
INTEREST BALANCING CONSIDERATIONS IN JORDAN 
In the Jordan majority’s view, the transition from the fexible Morin framework to 
one predicated on a simplifed calculus was pragmatically necessary to remedy the 
“doctrinal and practical difculties plaguing the analytical framework.”6 Under 
Morin, trial judges balanced several factors in the determination of whether the 
delay in a given case was reasonable: “the length of the delay,” “waiver of any time 
periods,” “the reasons for the delay,” and “any prejudice to the accused.”7 While 
temporal “guidelines” developed, they were more complicated to calculate and 
compliance was merely one factor in a sweeping balancing analysis. Owing in 
part to this over-inclusion of conceptually distinct factors, the Jordan majority 
found that the Morin framework was “unpredictable,” “highly subjective,” 
5. Te term “interest balancing” was conceived of by Paul Gerwitz: 
Under the approach I shall call ‘Interest Balancing,’ remedial efectiveness for victims is only 
one of the factors in choosing a remedy; other social interests are also relevant and may justify 
some sacrifce of achievable remedial efectiveness. In evaluating a remedy, courts in some sense 
‘balance’ its net remedial benefts to victims against the net costs it imposes on a broader range 
of social interests. 
Paul Gerwitz, “Remedies and Resistance” (1983) 92 Yale LJ 585 at 591. See also Sonja 
B Starr, “Rethinking ‘Efective Remedies’: Remedial Deterrence in International Courts” 
(2008) 83 NYU L Rev 693. An interest balancing approach “permit[s] courts to justify 
remedial shortfall based on other interests beyond those of the plaintifs” (ibid at 753). 
6. R v Cody, 2017 SCC 31 at para 1 [Cody]. 
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“unduly complex,” and ultimately failed to “achieve future compliance with 
consistent standards.”8 
By addressing these doctrinal and practical difculties, the Jordan framework 
presents a real promise of faster trials more frequently. Implementing a simplifed 
and defnitive calculus allowed the majority to set concrete deadlines for 
the administration of justice and instil a degree of objectivity lacking under 
Morin—developments which the majority believed will increase “confdence in 
the administration of justice.”9 Te ability to foresee whether a section 11(b) 
issue is likely to arise at the pretrial phase through reference to the applicable 
Jordan ceiling has enabled justice system participants to streamline scheduling 
procedures and target problem cases. Te presumption of (un)reasonableness that 
hinges upon compliance with those ceilings allowed the majority to implement 
“constructive incentives” designed to ensure proactivity on the part of both the 
Crown and defence.10 In R v Cody, the Supreme Court unanimously emphasized 
the “important role trial judges play” post-Jordan “in curtailing unnecessary delay 
and changing courtroom culture,” encouraging them to manage cases actively and 
summarily dismiss frivolous applications.11 Finally, the Jordan decision itself led to 
increased public and governmental attention to existing delay issues, contributing 
to an increase in resources for the administration of justice.12 Cumulatively, these 
developments appear to have begun the difcult work of combatting the culture 
of complacency towards delay condemned by the majority. 
8. Jordan, supra note 1 at paras 31-45. Even the dissent, which would have upheld the Morin 
framework, agreed “that the way in which Morin ha[d] come to be applied is unduly 
complicated” (ibid at para 158). 
9. Jordan, supra note 1 at para 55. 
10. Ibid at para 51. Tere are three incentives. First, when the presumptive ceiling has been 
exceeded and the Crown seeks to rely on discrete events, it bears the onus of demonstrating 
that it took “reasonable available steps to avoid and address the problem before the delay 
exceeded the ceiling.” Ibid at para 70; Cody, supra note 6 at paras 48-62. Second, under the 
“particularly complex case” exception, the Crown must demonstrate that it “developed and 
followed a concrete plan to minimize the delay occasioned by such complexity.” Jordan, supra
note 1 at para 79; R v Saikaley, 2017 ONCA 374 at paras 41-48. Tird, to discharge its onus 
where the remaining delay falls below the presumptive ceiling, the defence must show that it 
took “meaningful, sustained steps to expedite the proceedings,” but the case nevertheless took 
“markedly longer than it reasonably should have.” Jordan, supra note 1 at para 84. 
11. Supra note 6 at paras 36-39. For an example of this process working as intended, see R v 
Papasotiriou-Lanteigne, 2017 ONSC 5337. 
12. A point to which we return later in this article. For example, the province of Ontario hiring 
new Crowns and judges in 2016. Sean Fine, “Ontario to hire more judges, prosecutors to 
tackle trial delays,” Te Globe and Mail (1 December 2016), online: <www.theglobeandmail. 
com/news/national/ontario-expands-criminal-justice-system-to-meet-supreme-court-trial-
deadlines/article33120097> [perma.cc/2SYB-H8UH]. 






















Te dissent in Jordan, however, held that the majority’s framework “reduces 
reasonableness to two numerical ceilings.”13 While itself an over-simplifcation, 
this concern has merit.14 In their warranted bid for simplicity, the Jordan majority 
incorporated two Morin factors into the Jordan ceilings such that they are no 
longer considered on a case-by-case basis: (1) the amount of demonstrable 
prejudice sufered to the accused’s liberty, security of the person, and fair trial 
interests; and (2) the gravity of the ofence charged. Under Jordan, prejudice is 
presumed once the “remaining delay”15 exceeds the relevant ceiling. Similarly, the 
seriousness of the charge “cannot be relied upon,” and is relevant only insofar as it 
afects the Crown’s election and therefore the applicable ceiling.16 Tis approach 
sits in stark contrast to the Morin framework, where case-by-case variations 
in prejudice and the seriousness of the ofence often “played a decisive role in 
whether delay was unreasonable.”17 
Tis development is analytically important because prejudice is a measure 
of the personal cost exacted on a given defendant by the alleged Charter 
infringement, while the seriousness of the charge which the defendant seeks to 
have stayed is a measure of the potential cost exacted on society by the proposed 
remedy.18 Cumulatively, the presumption of prejudice and the removal of the 
13. Supra note 1 at para 254. 
14. See Cody, supra note 6 (intervening provincial Attorneys General requested that the Supreme 
Court modify the Jordan framework to allow for more fexibility when deducting delay—a 
request which was declined by the unanimous Court). 
15. We use “remaining delay” here and throughout the article as a term of art, meaning the fnal 
operative delay after defence delay and delay owing to exception circumstances have been 
deducted. See Jordan, supra note 1 at para 75; R v Coulter, 2016 ONCA 704 at para 38. Tis 
treatment of prejudice is actually a return to Lamer J’s view in Rahey. See Rahey, supra note 4 
at para 36. Interestingly, just one year prior in Mills, Justice Lamer was of the view that actual 
prejudice was a remedial concern. However, in Rahey, Justice Lamer saw prejudice as relevant 
to the determination of whether a remedy “additional to a stay” should follow. See Rahey, 
supra note 4 at para 38. Jordan, supra note 1 at para 54. 
16. Jordan, supra note 1 at para 81. Under Jordan, “once the ceiling is breached, an absence of 
actual prejudice cannot convert an unreasonable delay into a reasonable one” (ibid at para 
54). In Jordan’s companion case, R v Williamson, the majority stated that the right to be tried 
within a reasonable time “does not admit gradients or reasonableness where the charges are 
serious.” R v Williamson, 2016 SCC 28 at para 35. 
17. Jordan, supra note 1 at para 96. 
18. As discussed below, a stay deprives society of a trial on its merits. Where there is sufcient 
evidence to prove an ofence beyond a reasonable doubt, society is deprived of its interests 
in the objectives of sentencing, both retributivist and utilitarian. We recognize that there is 
also a societal interest, as recognized in Jordan, in having accused person brought to trial in 
a timely manner. We address this point below. Te salient point at this stage of the article is 
that the balance between the relevant interests fuctuates. Surely society’s interest is not always 
in favour of a stay, and the primary factor that cuts against a stay is a serious charge. Jordan, 
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seriousness of the ofence as a factor in Jordan mean trial judges may no longer 
explicitly balance the accused’s interest in a stay against society’s interest in a trial. 
Te Jordan framework is also inherently unconcerned with how much the 
“remaining delay” exceeds the relevant ceiling, as well as the cause(s) of that 
excess (with the sole exception where that excess is caused by the complexity 
of the case).19 As long as the delay is operative (i.e., not waived, caused by the 
defence, or caused by exceptional circumstances), the Jordan calculus does not 
distinguish in kind between more troubling forms of delay—such as delay 
caused by abusive state conduct or endemic institutional under-resourcing— 
and less troubling delay caused by the inherent time requirements of a criminal 
investigation and prosecution. Tis approach also difers from that of the Morin 
framework, where periods of delay that were considered inherent to criminal 
prosecution were subtracted.20 Te Jordan framework also does not distinguish in 
result between cases with thirty months and one day of remaining delay and cases 
with substantially more. Both are equally and automatically stayed. Tis third 
factor could be called the seriousness of the Charter infringement. 
In stark contrast to the Morin framework, the Jordan framework is therefore 
indiferent to case-by-case variations in: (1) the efects of the delay on the accused; 
(2) the efects of a potential stay on society; and (3) the actual seriousness of the 
section 11(b) infringement itself. Consequently, Jordan reconfgures the section 
11(b) analysis from an “interest balancing” framework—where individual and 
societal interests are weighed diametrically against one another—to an absolutist 
one, where the length of the “remaining delay” is dispositive of the analysis 
subject to a few exceptions.21 Because Jordan does not permit this interest 
balancing under section 11(b), and the automatic stay rule necessarily precludes 
any remedial interest balancing, variations in these three factors no longer play 
any part in our section 11(b) regime at all. 
II. CLEARED DECKS: INTEREST BALANCING AND OTHER 
CHARTER VIOLATIONS 
A survey of remedial jurisprudence for violations of Charter rights other than section 
11(b) demonstrates that analogous factors are frequently considered relevant 
19. Jordan, supra note 1 at paras 76-81. Again, we use “remaining delay” here as a term of art 
(ibid at para 75). See also Coulter, supra note 15 at para 38. 
20. For example, intake periods at the Provincial and Superior Courts, the time required for 
pre-trials, and preparation time for trial. R v Nguyen, 2013 ONCA 169 at paras 54, 59; 
R v Tran, 2012 ONCA 18 at paras 32, 38-40. 
21. Gerwitz, supra note 5; Starr, supra note 5. Te Morin framework was a “balancing” 
framework. See Morin, supra note 1 at 787. 















to the determination of an appropriate remedy. Tis process generally follows 
the same two-stage paradigm, where the court makes a binary determination 
whether a Charter breach has occurred before balancing the relevant individual 
and societal interests at the remedial stage. Te removal of these factors from the 
section 11(b) analysis in Jordan may, therefore, herald their subsequent use in 
crafting an interest balancing remedial framework for unreasonable delay under 
section 24(1) of the Charter.22 
Both the R v Grant test to exclude evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter
and the R v Babos test to stay charges for abuse of process under section 24(1) weigh 
individual and societal interests against one another in the determination of an 
appropriate remedy and are therefore interest balancing remedial frameworks.23 
Te following table demonstrates that the Grant and Babos frameworks are 
constructed from factors directly analogous to those which the Court either 
presumed in, or excised from, the section 11(b) framework in Jordan. 
TABLE 1: SURVEY OF REMEDIAL JURISPRUDENCE 
Section 11(b) Remedial Concern Section 24(2) Section 24(1) Terminology (plain language) Terminology (Grant) Terminology (Babos)(Morin, Jordan) 
By how much was Te “isolated or1) How serious is the the Jordan ceiling Te “seriousness of systemic and ongoingCharter infringement? exceeded? the Charter-infringing nature of the What caused the state conduct”24 conduct”25 excess delay? 
Demonstrable “Prejudice to the prejudice to the Te “impact on the2) How did the accused’s right to a defendant’s liberty, Charter-protected Charter infringement fair trial”28 security of the person, interests of the afect the defendant? “Te circumstances of and/or fair trial accused”27 the accused”29 interests26 
22. Justice Lamer identifed demonstrable prejudice as a remedial concern. Justice Lamer stated, 
“[A]ctual prejudice is therefore irrelevant when deter mining unreasonable delay. Actual 
prejudice will, however, be relevant to a determination of appropriate relief.” Mills, supra note 
4 at para 221. 
23. R v Grant, 2009 SCC 32 [Grant]; R v Paterson, 2017 SCC 15 [Paterson]; R v McGufe, 
2016 ONCA 365 at paras 59-64 [McGufe]; R v Riley, 2018 ONCA 998 at paras 42-43;
R v Babos, 2014 SCC 16 [Babos]; R v Conway, [1989] 1 SCR 1659. 
24. Grant, supra note 23 at paras 72-75. 
25. Babos, supra note 23 at para 41. 
26. Jordan, supra note 1 at paras 153-55; Morin, supra note 1 at 802-03. 
27. Grant, supra note 23 at paras 76-78. 
28. R v Gowdy, 2016 ONCA 989 at para 59 [Gowdy]. 
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TABLE 1: SURVEY OF REMEDIAL JURISPRUDENCE 
Te “charges faced by 
the accused”33 
Te “interests of 
Te gravity of the 
ofence(s) charged30 3) How will the “Society’s interest in Society’s interest proposed remedy an adjudication onin deterring delayafect society? the merits”32 causing state 
conduct31 
society in having the 
charges determined 
on their merits”34 
“Prejudice to … the 
justice system that 
will be manifested, 
perpetuated or 
aggravated through 
the conduct of 
the trial, or by its 
outcome”35 
Te framework for the exclusion of evidence under section 24(1) (as opposed 
to section 24(2)) also balances similar factors and largely mirrors the Babos
framework.36 In these other Charter contexts, the court frst determines whether a 
Charter infringement has occurred—a binary inquiry in which the Charter right 
is ideally defned clearly and objectively—and then balances competing interests 
30. Jordan, supra note 1 at para 81. Prior to Jordan, the s 11(b) jurisprudence had long 
recognized that “more serious ofences will carry commensurately stronger societal demands 
that the accused be brought to trial” (ibid at para 212). See also Askov, supra note 1 at 1226. 
31. Whether and how societal interests would weigh in favour of a stay under an interest 
balancing remedial framework is an issue discussed further below. Such an approach would 
echo the recognition in Jordan that the public “interest is served by promptly bringing those 
charged with criminal ofences to trial,” as well as the early Charter debate that ultimately 
foreclosed any collective rights dimension to s 11(b). Jordan, supra note 1 at para 2. See also 
Mills, supra note 4 at para 189. 
32. Grant, supra note 23 at paras 79-86. Tis factor under s 24(2) relies upon s 11(b) 
jurisprudence; namely, the recognition in R v Askov that society has a “collective interest in 
ensuring that those who transgress the law are brought to trial and dealt with according to 
the law” (ibid at para 79) citing Askov, supra note 1 at 1219-20. In Grant, the majority found 
that the seriousness of the ofence “has the potential to cut both ways” (ibid at para 84). 
33. Babos, supra note 23 at para 41; Gowdy, supra note 28 at para 62. 
34. Gowdy, supra note 28 at para 62. 
35. Babos, supra note 23 at para 32. Tis factor—as well as the recognition in Grant that the 
seriousness of the ofence “has the potential to cut both ways”—recognizes that societal 
interests do not always militate against a drastic remedy. Supra note 23 at para 84. See also, 
McGufe, supra note 23 at para 60. 
36. R v Bjelland, 2009 SCC 38 at paras 18-27 [Bjelland]. 
(2019) 56 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL













to ensure the ultimate disposition is equitable, responsive, and a function of 
judicial discretion.37 
Te right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter—which the majority 
likened to section 11(b) in Jordan—provides a useful case in point because, 
like section 11(b), it concerns a temporal limit on how long a state actor has 
to implement a defendant’s Charter right.38 In R v Suberu, the Court defned 
the informational component of section 10(b) clearly and objectively, holding 
that the right to be informed of one’s right to counsel “without delay” means 
“immediately upon detention.”39 Similarly, in Jordan, the Court defned the right 
to be tried “within a reasonable time” clearly and objectively by establishing 
eighteen-month and thirty-month ceilings. Unlike the Jordan ceilings, however, 
the absolutism of the “immediately upon detention” rule is subsequently 
tempered by the remedial Grant framework, which confers upon the trial judge 
discretion not to exclude the evidence at issue when a nuanced balancing of the 
relevant interests militates against doing so. Te result is a clear, objective, and 
purposive interpretation of the section 10(b) right that does not under-represent 
individual or societal interests because those interests are properly considered 
remedial.40 Tis example demonstrates the congruity with which this two-stage 
paradigm could be adopted for the section 11(b) regime. 
III. MUDDIED WATERS: THE PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF THE 
AUTOMATIC STAY RULE 
Te practical efects arising from the current dearth of interest balancing under 
Jordan and Rahey range from plainly obvious to subtly and incrementally 
problematic. One efect that rarely fails to escape public consciousness when 
serious charges are stayed for unreasonable delay is that the accused may receive a 
windfall. Te judicial stay has been called “the ultimate remedy” by the Court.41 
37. Vanessa MacDonnell, “R v Sinclair: Balancing Individual Rights and Societal Interests 
Outside of Section 1 of the Charter” (2012) 38 Queen’s LJ 137 (arguing against muddying 
the Charter’s Legal Rights with internal interest balancing). 
38. Supra note 1 at para 86. 
39. 2009 SCC 33 at paras 37-42 [emphasis added]. 
40. Tis point takes on new signifcance when one considers that the rule in Suberu is further 
qualifed by another interest balancing framework: the s 1 Oakes test. See R v Oakes, [1986] 
1 SCR 103. See also R v Orbanski, 2005 SCC 37 at para 54. Te Supreme Court found that 
society’s interest in “reducing the carnage caused by impaired driving” justifes the suspension 
of the ‘immediately upon detention’ rule during roadside stops. 
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It is the most drastic remedy available for any Charter violation that is not 
“prescribed by law” such that the law itself may be declared of no force or efect 
under section 52(1).42 As a result, a stay is normally reserved for the “clearest 
of cases” and the Court has found it to be unavailable in cases of serious, even 
“reprehensible” state conduct—such as R v Tobiass, where the Crown withheld 
“substantial evidence” that supported a murder suspect’s alibi and cast doubt 
on the credibility of Crown witnesses, and Babos, where two ofcers colluded 
about frearm evidence and the Crown threatened to lay additional charges if 
the accused did not plead guilty.43 In light of this high bar, it is difcult not to 
conclude that a hypothetical defendant has received a windfall when their case is 
stayed, without any further inquiry, because it took thirty months and one day of 
operative delay to complete their trial.44 
Just as society may be deprived of justice for the guilty, presumptively 
innocent accused persons may also be deprived of an acquittal on the merits 
of the evidence. In the words of Akhil Amar on its American counterpart, the 
automatic stay rule “giv[es] the guilty a windfall and the innocent a brushof.”45 
Tese more obvious efects were recognized by the Standing Senate Committee 
on Legal and Constitutional Afairs, which described in its post-Jordan report 
how a stay both “has the potential to let a murderer walk away from their crime 
unpunished” and to “den[y] a chance of public vindication to the victim, the 
accused and to Canadian society more broadly.”46 
Subtler, more incremental efects fow from the inevitable creep of interest 
balancing concerns into the substantive section 11(b) analysis itself. Te point is 
best demonstrated with an example. A hypothetical defendant is charged with 
murder. Tey are arrested the day of the ofence on the basis of acute public 
safety concerns, even though the investigation is at a nascent stage. Teir 
phone is seized upon arrest but locked. Tey are released on reasonable bail. 
During the course of the prosecution, the defendant, a YouTube sensation, 
42. A process which triggers the cardinal interest balancing framework under the Charter: Te s 
1 R v Oakes test. Upon fnding that a Charter infringement that has been “prescribed by law,” 
the efects of that violation are weighed against that law’s efcacy and the importance of its 
societal goal. See Oakes, supra note 40. See also MacDonnell, supra note 37. 
43. R v Taillefer; R v Duguay, 2003 SCC 70; Babos, supra note 23 at paras 53-74. 
44. Te hypothetical defendant’s case is not “particularly complex” within the meaning of Jordan. 
See Jordan, supra note 1 at paras 77-81. 
45. Akhil Reed Amar, “Foreword: Sixth Amendment First Principles” (1996) 84 
Geo LJ 641 at 652. 
46. Senate, Delaying Justice is Denying Justice: An Urgent Need to Address Lengthy Court Delays in 
Canada: Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Afairs (June 
2017) (Chair: Bob Runciman) at 37 [Senate Report]. 










tweets consistently about how their arrest and pending charges have enhanced 
their rebellious image and resulted in their fnancial gain.47 Te original trial is 
scheduled to begin twenty-four months after the defendant’s arrest. Due to a 
confuence of neglect, inadvertence, and technological advancement, the police 
do not successfully crack the defendant’s phone until the eve of trial. Te phone 
results in reams of new evidence that renders the Crown’s case overwhelming 
(but not “particularly complex”). On that basis, the defence successfully seeks an 
adjournment. Te second trial dates are scheduled to conclude mere weeks after 
the thirty-month mark. 
Tough the delay in this hypothetical may be unreasonable, all three interest 
balancing factors militate against a stay. Tere is little, if any, demonstrable 
prejudice to the defendant’s liberty, security of the person, or fair trial interests. 
Society’s interest in a trial on its merits is high due to the gravity of the charge 
and the overwhelming strength of the Crown’s case. Te remaining delay only 
marginally exceeds the relevant thirty-month ceiling and the trial would have 
concluded under the Jordan ceiling but for the fnal six months of delay caused by 
state conduct that, while certainly problematic, is not the result of systemic issues 
or bad faith. Nevertheless, Jordan and Rahey require the trial judge to stay the 
charge entirely. Despite the majority’s optimism that Jordan will increase public 
confdence in the administration of justice, Canadians would likely be unsatisfed 
with this outcome.48 
While entering a stay in this hypothetical would under-represent society’s 
interest in a trial on its merits, declining to fnd a violation may perniciously 
undermine the section 11(b) rights of the defendant, as well as future defendants. 
47. While relatively few accused persons purport to beneft from their criminal charges, 
Canadian courts have long recognized that some accused persons ‘welcome’ delay and there 
exist “persons who are in fact guilty of their charges [and] content to see their trials delayed 
for as long as possible.” Morin, supra note 1 at 811. Jordan, supra note 1 at para 21. See also 
Askov, supra note 1 at para 48. 
48. For a real-life example of Canadians dissatisfed because a serious charge was stayed without 
considering the gravity of the ofence, see R v Picard, 2016 ONSC 7061; “Ottawa judge 
stays 1st-degree murder charge over trial delay” CBC (15 November 2016), online: <www. 
cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/trial-delay-judge-stays-1st-degree-murder-1.3852486> [perma. 
cc/3YV5-8QWZ]; “Parents of Fouad Nayel join protest outside Ottawa courthouse after 
murder trial halted” CBC (17 November 2016), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/ 
ottawa-courthouse-protest-nov-17-1.3855094> [perma.cc/C7VH-GWZL]; Kathleen 
Harris, “‘Dire situation’: Senators seek guidance for top court ruling on trial deadlines” 
CBC (1 December 2016), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/senate-legal-jordan-trial-
delays-1.3877101> [perma.cc/Q5F3-XD2R]. Picard was overturned on appeal in part 
because the trial judge underemphasized the weight to be attributed to the seriousness of the 
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Te hypothetical trial judge is faced with a dilemma: Either stay a case with a 
compelling public interest in a trial on its merits or strain the boundaries of the 
Jordan framework to manufacture a few weeks of subtractable delay—likely in 
this case by excusing and therefore normalizing the negligent police conduct that 
caused the fnal delay.49 
Tis phenomenon, referred to as “remedial deterrence,” occurs when the 
gravity of a given remedy is pitted against the fnding of a rights violation.50Because 
the most drastic remedy available in the Canadian criminal justice system fows 
inexorably from the fnding of a section 11(b) violation, the Court, academics, 
and the aforementioned Standing Senate Committee have all acknowledged 
that remedial deterrence inevitably, and perhaps understandably, dissuades trial 
judges from properly identifying unreasonable delay.51 Te Jordan framework, 
by virtue of its more restrictive approach to internal balancing, is more vulnerable 
to this tacit creep of interest balancing as trial judges inevitably struggle for the 
49. In this case, the trial judge would likely feel pressure to fnd that cracking the phone 
constituted an exceptional circumstance. 
50. “We should expect that raising the ‘price’ of a constitutional violation by enhancing the 
remedy will, all things being equal, result in fewer violations.” See Daryl J Levinson, “Rights 
Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration” (1999) 99 Colum L Rev 857 at 889; Starr, 
supra note 5 at 695. See also Richard H Fallon, Jr, “Te Linkage between Justiciability and 
Remedies and their Connections to Substantive Rights” (2006) 92 Va L Rev 633. 
51. For acknowledgement from the Court, see Jordan, supra note 1 at para 35: 
Tis after-the-fact review of past delay is understandably frustrating for trial judges, who have 
only one remedial tool at their disposal—a stay of proceedings. It is therefore unsurprising that 
courts have occasionally strained in applying the Morin framework to avoid a stay. 
In the words of Justice La Forest, predicting this eventuality, see Mills, supra note 4 at para 
331. Justice La Forest comments, “the adoption of [a stay] as the sole remedy would in my 
view have the efect of making the courts seriously hesitate before adopting it in any given 
case.” For acknowledgement from academics, see Christopher Sherrin, “Reconsidering the 
Charter Remedy for Unreasonable Delay in Criminal Cases” (2016) 20 Can Crim L Rev 
263. Sherrin comments, “[w]e sometimes dismiss serious charges unnecessarily and more 
often dismiss applications for Charter relief even though the accused has experienced lengthy 
delay and sufered prejudice” (ibid at 264). See also, Justice Casey Hill & Jeremy Tatum, 
“Re-Chartering an Old Course Rather than Staying Anew in Remedying Unreasonable Delay 
under the Charter” (2012), online: <www.crowndefence.ca/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/ 
Justice-Casey-Hill_Remedying-Unreasonable-Delay1.pdf> at 52-58. Justice Hill 
and Tatum note: 
Te efect of the remedial deterrence infuence is that delay though recognized to be 
unjustifable or excessive or lamentable, and accompanied by prejudice to an accused’s liberty 
and security of the person’s interests, too often results in a fnding that the section 11(b) 
Charter right has not been violated. 
(2019) 56 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
 
 








means to grapple with variations in the facially relevant interests at play. Indeed, 
the question must be asked whether a trial judge can—or should—ever disregard 
the fact that she is being asked to stay an overwhelming frst-degree murder case 
as opposed to a lesser charge.52 
In a prospective sense, the real pernicious efects of this interest balancing creep 
occur when jurists rely on our hypothetical trial judge’s precedent, normalizing 
Charter-infringing state conduct in future cases. Tat societal interests come 
to compromise accused persons’ Charter rights themselves rather than merely 
countervailing their interest in a particular remedy is but one resulting problem. 
Another is that, because trial judges conduct this balancing implicitly, they do 
so without any guiding principle or structure, and are left to address facially 
relevant interest balancing factors on an ad hoc, implicit, and therefore inevitably 
more arbitrary manner.53 Finally, it is questionable whether balancing societal 
Ibid at 51. Te Senate Committee indicated that the severity of the mandatory remedy may 
dissuade some judges from fnding that there has been a s 11(b) violation. Senate Report, 
supra note 46 at 37. 
52. Indeed, it has been suggested that legal rights cannot properly be conceived without taking 
measure of the remedy that follows from the fnding of the violation of that right. See 
Levinson, supra note 50. David Rudovsky comments on Levinson: 
For Levinson, the notion of a “pure right” is fction, as remedies ultimately control the 
value of any constitutional right. Under this view, when the Court articulates the scope of a 
constitutional right, it does so against the backdrop of the remedial feld, and the constitutional 
defnition is directly afected by the range of possible remedies. 
David Rudovsky, “Running in Place: Te Paradox of Expanding Rights and Restricted 
Remedies” [2005] U Ill L Rev 1199 at 1203. 
Justice Paciocco has argued that it is “legitimate, predictable and inevitable” that judges 
“seek out and use available legal tools” to avoid unfairness resulting from the lack of judicial 
discretion resulting from mandatory minimums. David Paciocco, “Te Law of Minimum 
Sentences: Judicial Responses and Responsibility” (2015) 19 Can Crim L Rev 173 at 173. 
Remedial deterrence raises the obverse query: whether it is desirable for judges to exercise the 
same creativity in avoiding outcomes that are unfair to society when constrained by a lack of 
remedial fexibility. 
53. MacDonnell has written about interest balancing under s 10(b) in R v Sinclair. MacDonnell, 
supra note 37 at 161. “Tere is no indication that any principle—not proportionality or 
anything else—governs the balancing of interests in any meaningful way. One might infer 
that ‘balancing’ means some variant of proportionality, but the case law simply does not 
bear this out.” Take, for example, the nebulous way in which Justice Le Dain accepted that 
interest balancing would afect the s 11(b) analysis in Rahey, supra note 4 at para 58: 
Tere is no doubt, as suggested by La Forest J. and the critics of the American jurisprudence, 
that this drastic outcome [a stay] must inevitably infuence the determination whether there 
has been an infringement of the right to be tried within a reasonable time. Tis may well ensure 
that there are compelling reasons for such a determination, which in my opinion is a good 
thing, but it need not, as the result in the present appeal indicates, and must not deter a court 
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interests is the proper function of the judiciary under legal rights analyses at 
all. As Professor Vanessa MacDonnell has compellingly argued, “the Charter’s
substantive guarantees were simply not designed to protect societal interests, and 
there are compelling reasons why courts should not disregard the structure of the 
Charter by imposing internal limits on those guarantees.”54 
In sum, our current regime’s paucity of interest balancing results in a 
fundamental tension caused by a lack of judicial discretion and nuance. Tis 
tension will persist and propagate until such time as the Court re-introduces 
interest balancing factors in a remedial framework for section 11(b) violations. 
In efect, the remedy is in the remedy. 
IV. THE COURSE DIVERGENT: THE RATIONALE IN RAHEY
AND CORRECTIVE JUSTICE UNDER SECTION 24(1) 
With several compelling reasons why an interest balancing remedial framework 
ought to exist for section 11(b) violations, it is worth asking why Canadian courts 
have yet to fashion one. A historical perspective suggests the rudder has been 
locked on a singular course in this regard since 1987. Although appellate courts 
have occasionally recognized the “conceptual attractive[ness]” of alternative 
remedies (before ultimately concluding they are unavailable), the remedial issue 
has not been addressed by the Court since Rahey.55 Indeed, the Court elected 
not to address the issue in Morin, despite being invited to do so by the Attorney 
General of Canada.56 Terefore, the rationale for the automatic stay rule remains, 
at least explicitly, that which Justices Lamer, Wilson and Le Dain articulated in 
three concurring decisions in Rahey. It is important for this discussion to note 
exactly what the rationale in that decision was—and perhaps more important to 
note what it was not. 
Put simply, the automatic stay rule in Rahey was premised on the presumption 
that the corollary to the right to be tried within a reasonable time is “the right not 
54. Ibid at 140. 
55. Te alternative remedy argument is “conceptually attractive and ostensibly supported by 
recent developments in Charter jurisprudence more generally,” but it is “precluded by the 
current state of the law.” R v Pidskalny, 2013 SKCA 74 at para 48; R v CD, 2014 ABCA 333 
at paras 41-45. 
56. Morin, supra note 1 at 809. Te majority states that “[i]n view of the result at which I have 
arrived, it is unnecessary to consider the argument of the Attorney General of Canada 
that a stay is not the only remedy available for an infringement of the right protected by 
section 11(b).” 










   





to be tried beyond that time.”57 In efect, the majority held that a trial beyond a 
reasonable time would serve only to exacerbate the violation.58 In a telling piece 
of obiter dicta, four of the six justices who held this view also believed that a 
section 11(b) infringement resulted in a loss of jurisdiction, a view which has 
never found majority favour.59 In settling on the automatic stay rule, the Court 
relied heavily on the American decision, Barker v Wingo, but was entirely silent 
on European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence that had already rejected 
that approach.60 Te Court’s reliance on Wingo has since been criticized on a 
number of grounds.61 Most signifcantly for the purposes of this article, the 
United States Constitution does not contain a remedial provision, let alone one 
with the fexibility prescribed by section 24(1) of the Charter, which afords a 
court of competent jurisdiction the discretion to grant “such remedy as the court 
considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.” We will return to this point 
momentarily, but it is useful frst to address two points which, while some may 
argue they have implicitly come to form part of the rationale for the automatic 
stay rule, have not been articulated as such. 
First, the automatic stay rule was not founded on the premise that only the 
gravity of a stay would motivate societal actors to care about delay. Te threat 
of numerous stays, such a rationale would posit, is necessary for the judiciary 
to ensure sufcient resources are allocated to the criminal justice system and 
catalyze societal and administrative reform. Notionally at least, by wielding this 
57. Rahey, supra note 4 at para 61, Lamer J, Dickson CJC concurring. Per Justice Wilson and 
Justice Etsey concurring: 
[I]n my view, what the court cannot do is fnd that his right has been violated, i.e., that the 
reasonable time has already expired, and still press him on to trial, for to do so is to deprive 
him of his right under section 11(b) in the pretext of granting him a remedy for its violation 
(ibid at para 56). 
For his criticism of this rationale, see Sherrin, supra note 52 at 264. 
58. Sherrin, supra note 51 at 271. 
59. Rahey, supra note 4 at paras 48-65. Justice Le Dain, with Justice Beets concurring, 
advanced what would ultimately become the position of the Court: “I do not fnd it 
necessary, in support of this conclusion, to characterize such an infringement as going to 
the jurisdiction to try an accused, although such a characterization may well be justifed for 
other purposes.” 
60. 407 US 514 (1972). Hill & Tatum, supra note 51 at 60, citing Eckle v Germany, [1982] 
ECHR 4 (Germany) [Eckle]. Hill and Tatum consider demonstrable prejudice as relevant not 
to whether the delay was unreasonable, but whether a sentence reduction was appropriate. 
Hill and Tatum also consider Corigliano v Italy, fnding a declaration of a breach and costs 
the appropriate remedy. [1982] ECHR 10. 
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mobilizing power, Canadian courts are able to safeguard not only the rights of 
accused persons but also society’s collective interest in trying criminal matters 
expeditiously—whether society likes it at the time or not. Tis dual conception 
of society’s interest as simultaneously militating in favour of and against a stay 
would echo the Court’s ruling in Grant that society may have a greater interest in 
excluding evidence where the charges are serious.62 It would also accord with the 
Jordan majority’s increased focus on the collective interests triggered by section 
11(b).63 Te concurring decisions in Rahey, however, were predicated on an 
individual rather than collective rights conception of section 11(b).64 Terefore, 
if the automatic stay rule has developed a collective rights dimension, it has done 
so implicitly. 
Recognizing as much, however, may be problematic for a number of other 
reasons. First, those who often presume to speak most vociferously on behalf 
of Canadian society when it comes to issues of criminal justice may very well 
disagree that society’s interest in motivating expeditious justice in a prospective 
sense outweighs its interest in trying a given case on its merits, particularly when 
the allegations are shocking. Such candour may, therefore, prove invidious.65 
A related issue is that recognizing a collective rights dimension to the 
automatic stay rule may call into question the propriety of the judiciary, 
as opposed to Parliament, as the head of power to impose a blanket rule on 
62. See Grant, supra note 24 at para 84. See also, McGufe, supra note 24 at para 60. 
63. Supra note 1 at paras 19-28. 
64. Justice Lamer was silent on the issue in Rahey but was explicit in his reliance on his reasons 
in Mills, with which the two concurring decisions ostensibly agreed on this point. See Mills,
supra note 4 at para 20. Justice Lamer explicitly rejected the proposition that s 11(b) had a 
collective rights dimension: 
Section 11(b) enunciates an individual right … this right is, in its nature, an individual right 
and has no collective rights dimension. While society may well have an interest in the prompt 
and efective prosecution of criminal cases, that interest fnds no expression in section 11(b), 
though evidently, incidental satisfaction … the societal beneft … though of great importance, 
is a by-product of the section; it is not its object (ibid at para 140). 
Rahey precedes the Court’s recognition that society has a “collective interest in ensuring that 
those who transgress the law are brought to trial and dealt with according to the law.” See 
Askov, supra note 1 at para 76. 
65. For a discussion as to whether judges should moderate their decisions to avoid publicly 
contentious decisions, see Alexander Bickel, Te Least Dangerous Branch: Te Supreme Court 
at the Bar of Politics, 2nd ed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986); Cass R Sunstein, “If 
People Would be Outraged by Teir Rulings, Should Judges Care?” (2007) 60 Stan L Rev 
155; Andrew B Coan, “Well, Should Tey? A Response to If People Would Be Outraged by 
Teir Rulings, Should Judges Care?” (2007) 60 Stan L Rev 213. 
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behalf of Canadians’ collective interests. To date, the automatic stay rule has 
been premised on the judiciary’s traditional role as the guardian of individual 
Charter rights. Purporting to speak on behalf of societal interests in all cases 
is quite another claim. While it is common for Canadian courts to weigh 
societal interests against those of the individual, that determination usually 
occurs as outlined above: Explicitly, on a case-by-case basis, and pursuant to 
a predetermined framework. By foregoing a remedial analysis in favour of the 
automatic stay rule, there is necessarily no mechanism for jurists to determine 
whether society’s interest in motivating expeditious justice actually outweighs its 
interest in a trial on the merits in any given case—a task which they are no doubt 
properly situated to undertake. What remains is something akin to a judicial 
statute of limitations. Indeed, subsequent to the Supreme Court of the United 
States’ decision in Wingo, Congress enacted the Speedy Trial Act, which largely 
subsumed the sixth amendment analogue to section 11(b) as it pertains to federal 
prosecutions.66 By and large, the individual states followed suit.67 
Te rationale for the automatic stay rule in Rahey also was not predicated on 
a determination that a stay is the only remedy capable of correcting the prejudice 
sufered by the accused. In fact, the concurring majority decisions – consumed 
with American precedent, the jurisdictional question, and rudimentary questions 
including whether real prejudice ought to inform the analysis at all, the concurring 
majority decisions largely failed to ask what remedies were capable of correcting 
prejudice to the individual interests it recognized as being protected by section 
11(b)—adopting instead the rationale that a trial after unreasonable delay will 
simply cause more unreasonable delay. Te problem with this simplistic rationale, 
as Professor Christopher Sherrin has succinctly put it, is that it “incorrectly 
assumes that the problem is delay in and of itself when the problem is actually the 
efects of delay on constitutionally protected interests.”68 In the words of Akhil 
Amar, “each legal interest has a unique size and shape, and its own uniquely apt 
remedy package. Remedies should ft rights, and if rights (or “legal interests”) do 
not come in a one-size-fts-all package, neither should remedies.”69 As discussed 
66. 18 USC § 3161 (1974). 
67. For a compendium of such legislation in place shortly thereafter, in 1978, see e.g. Burke 
O’Hara Fort et al, Speedy Trial: A Selected Bibliography and Comparative Analysis of State 
Speedy Trial Provisions (Washington, DC: Midwest Research Institute for National Institute 
of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice & Law Enforcement Assistance Administration & 
United States Department of Justice, 1978). 
68. Sherrin, supra note 51 at 264. 
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below, there exists a plethora of alternative remedies capable of substantially 
correcting or mitigating the efects of delay in any given case.70 
Arguably, this “corrective justice” approach, which, in the Legal Rights 
context, aims to “make-whole” the victim of constitutional violation by returning 
him or her to the position he or she occupied before the violation—should 
underpin all section 24(1) remedies.71 Interestingly, the Court initially adopted 
a burgeoning corrective justice approach to section 11(b) violations before 
reversing course in Rahey. In R v Mills, the Court held that a stay was not the 
only available remedy for unreasonable delay: 
No court may say, for example, that a stay of proceedings will always be appropriate 
in a given type of case. Although there will be cases where a trial judge may well 
conclude that a stay would be the appropriate remedy, the circumstances will be 
infnitely variable from case to case and the remedy will vary with the circumstances.72 
Te concurring decisions in Rahey did not comment on this reversal. On its 
face, however, the ruling in Mills is more congruent with the plainly capacious 
language of section 24(1), to “obtain such remedy as the court considers 
appropriate and just in the circumstances.” 
Over the past thirty years, the Court has shown a clear preference—in all 
facets of section 24(1) jurisprudence other than its application following section 
11(b)—for the fexible corrective approach prescribed in Mills over the narrow 
remedial view of Rahey.73 Examples abound. In R v Bellusci, the Court held 
that an efective remedy under section 24(1) should “vindicate the rights of the 
claimant, be fair to the party against whom it is ordered, and consider all other 
70. Sherrin, supra note 51. See also Anthony Amsterdam, “Speedy Criminal Trial: Rights and 
Remedies” (1975) 27 Stan L Rev 525 at 534-35. 
71. Kent Roach, “Te Limits of Corrective Justice and the Potential of Equity in Constitutional 
Remedies” (1991) 33 Ariz L Rev 859 at 867-69. 
72. Supra note 4 at para 23. Justice McIntyre wrote for three of seven justices. Justice La Forest 
concurred on this point. 
73. See e.g. R v Donnelly, 2016 ONCA 988 at para 146 (stating that “[i]t is difcult to 
imagine language which could equip a court with a wider and less fettered discretion”); 
Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), 2003 SCC 62 at paras 41, 52-56 
(holding that remedies under s 24(1) of the Charter are fexible and contextual); Bjelland, 
supra note 36 at para 18 (holding that s 24(1) remedies “address the most varied situations. 
Diferent considerations may come into play in the search for a proper balance between 
competing interests.”). See also Quebec v Jodoin, 2017 SCC 26 at para 25 [Jodoin]; Paterson,
supra note 23 at para 98. Justice Moldaver suggested in dissent that s 24(1) could provide an 
alternative remedy—a sentence reduction—even in exclusion of evidence cases. 
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relevant circumstances.”74 Similarly, in R v 974649 Ontario Inc, the Court held 
that section 24(1) “appears to confer the widest possible discretion on a court to 
craft remedies for violations of Charter rights” and “[t]his broad remedial mandate 
for section 24(1) should not be frustrated by a ‘[n]arrow and technical’ reading of 
the provision.”75 It is difcult to square these pronouncements with the narrow 
interpretation of section 24(1) as it pertains to unreasonable delay in Rahey. 
One possible explanation is that the proverbial tail more or less wagged 
the dog during the evolution of the section 11(b) jurisprudence. It is worth 
remembering that the automatic stay rule predates the Morin framework itself. 
By the time the Court decided Morin, it had clearly recognized the need for an 
interest balancing approach to unreasonable delay; however, having precluded 
any such balancing under a remedial framework fve years earlier in Rahey, the 
Court was unprepared to revisit the automatic stay rule.76 Instead, the Court 
chose to adopt the American approach and balance individual and societal 
interests under the section 11(b) framework itself—a decision which appears to 
have bifurcated the evolution of our section 11(b) regime from that of the other 
“Legal Rights.”77 Although Jordan has now properly overturned the inclusion of 
remedial factors under section 11(b) in Morin, the automatic stay rule persists as 
an unfortunate vestigial remnant of this bifurcation. 
Interestingly, Justice La Forest correctly predicted this evolution in his 
dissent in Rahey, holding that the automatic stay rule would “give the right 
in section 11(b) a pre-eminence over other Charter rights.”78 While Canadian 
courts have developed nuanced remedial frameworks for other Charter rights in 
the interim, the automatic stay rule has now persisted for thirty years, despite 
74. R v Bellusci, 2012 SCC 44 at para 18, citing Bjelland, supra note 36 at para 42; Hill & 
Tatum, supra note 51 at 52-58. 
75. R v 974649 Ontario Inc, 2001 SCC 81 at para 18, recently cited with approval in 
Jodoin, supra note 74. 
76. Morin, supra note 1 at 808. For how the Court decided Rahey before a s 11(b) framework 
existed and “before the [trial within a reasonable time] issue became a controversial one, see 
Janine Benedet et al, “30th Anniversary of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Te 
Impact on Criminal Justice” (2012) 91 CR (6th) 71. See also Hill, supra note 51 at 42-46. 
For pre-Rahey criticism of the American equivalent of the automatic stay rule, see Anthony 
Amsterdam, “Speedy Criminal Trial: Rights and Remedies” (1975) 27 Stan L Rev 525. 
77. “Legal Rights” are the heading for sections 7 to 14 of the Charter. Hill, supra note 51. 
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federal opposition, academic and juristic criticism, and international rejection.79 
In this regard, the Court’s decisions in Rahey and Morin are inextricable and, 
by overturning Morin, the majority decision in Jordan suggests Rahey may be 
obsolete. If this is the case, a return to the corrective principles in Mills is the 
next logical step. 
In this regard, although the Court did not address the remedial question in 
Jordan, the majority decision augurs well for the possibility of remedial reform. 
Te Court’s recognition that trial judges are “understandably frustrat[ed]” 
addressing delay retroactively with “only one remedial tool” is signifcant.80 In the 
wake of this obiter dicta, the Standing Senate Committee has recommended that 
the Attorney General of Canada refer the constitutionality of two alternative 
remedies—sentence reductions and cost orders—to the Court.81 Beyond these 
portents, however, this article has hopefully demonstrated that the particular 
construction of the Jordan framework itself is conducive to the development of a 
remedial framework, diferentiating the approach advocated in this article from 
its predecessors. 
79. For federal opposition, see Morin, supra note 1 at 809. For academic criticism, see Sherrin, 
supra note 51. Sherrin argues: 
Te reason why the Supreme Court decided that a stay of proceedings had to follow a fnding 
of unreasonable delay was the belief that anything less would only exacerbate the problem 
by permitting even more delay. Tis argument has superfcial appeal but ultimately collapses 
on closer scrutiny. It incorrectly assumes that the problem is delay in and of itself, when the 
problem is actually the efects of delay on constitutionally protected interests. If it is possible to 
eliminate or sufciently reduce those efects, as well as adequately compensate for them, then 
additional delay does not make a bad situation worse (ibid at 264). 
For Juristic, see Rahey, supra 4 at paras 59-75. For international opposition, see Senate Report,
supra note 46 at 39. 
80. Jordan, supra note 1 at para 35. 
81. Senate Report, supra note 46 at 40. Despite having the beneft of the testimony of Professor 
Christopher Sherrin, the Standing Senate Committee only suggested sentencing and costs as 
potential remedies for unreasonable delay. 














TABLE 2: DISCURSIVELY SITUATING THIS PAPER 
No remedial framework (the 
automatic stay rule) 
Alternative remedial 
framework 
Non-interest balancing s 
11(b) framework 
(adopted in Jordan, supra
note 1) 
Our current regime 
Te approach recommended 
by this paper 
Interest balancing s 11(b) 
framework 
(adopted in Morin, supra 
note 1) 
Our former regime 
Pre-Jordan alternative remedy 
proposals (Hill & Tatum, 
supra note 51; Sherrin, supra 
note 51) 
V. THE COURSE CORRECTED: CONSTRUCTING A REMEDIAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR UNREASONABLE DELAY 
Adopting this corrective approach, the appropriate remedy in a given case would 
be a function of the specifc form of prejudice sufered. Section 11(b) violations 
that cause demonstrable but reparable prejudice to the accused’s fair trial interest 
may, for example, be remedied with evidentiary rulings at trial.82 If a defence 
witness has become unavailable, the prejudice could be repaired or mitigated 
by adducing an out of court statement for the truth of its contents.83 In the 
wake of Jordan, a Standing Senate Committee has also suggested that costs might 
be awarded to compensate the accused for additional expenses in establishing 
evidence that has been lost due to unreasonable delay.84 If a Crown expert report 
has been prepared after the Jordan ceiling has been exceeded, it could be excluded. 
Tese evidentiary remedies are far more practicable post-Jordan because it is now 
clear precisely when a section 11(b) infringement crystalized.85 Such a regime 
may have been unworkable under Morin when the point in time at which the 
delay became unreasonable was paradoxically afected by demonstrable prejudice 
caused by that delay. 
82. Sherrin, supra note 51 at 273-79. 
83. Ibid at 275. 
84. Senate Report, supra note 46 at 38. 
85. While inferred prejudice is included in the Jordan ceilings, actual prejudice would only be 
relevant to the determination of an appropriate remedy. Jordan, supra note 1 at para 54. Te 
European Court of Human Rights adopted the latter approach. See Eckle, supra note 61. Tis 
approach would also accord with much of the pre-Morin jurisprudence. See Mills, supra note 
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In cases where unreasonable delay infringes the Applicant’s liberty and 
security of the person interests to a degree short of that warranting a stay, the trial 
judge could release the defendant from custody, relax their bail conditions, award 
costs, give enhanced credit for pre-trial custody, declare that the defendant’s 
Charter rights have been violated, and/or reduce the defendant’s sentence.86 Te 
most tangible remedy for a defendant who is ultimately convicted would likely be 
a sentence reduction or enhanced pre-trial credit.87 One or both of these regimes 
would have to be squared with any revised remedial scheme given the legislative 
restrictions on enhanced credit for pre-trial custody and recent jurisprudence on 
the unavailability of sentence reductions below a mandatory minimum.88 
Fewer remedies would be available to those who are ultimately acquitted. 
However, Professor Sherrin has suggested that costs, pre-trial orders, the 
declaration of a Charter violation, the peace of mind inherent in knowing 
in advance of trial that a sentence reduction will follow any fnding of guilt, 
and (“perversely”) the possibility of an acquittal provide signifcant redress for 
those who are ultimately acquitted.89 Another potential remedy—put forward 
by the Standing Senate Committee and proposed by the dissenting justices in 
Mills and Rahey as the “most obvious remedy for delay”—is an order expediting 
the proceedings.90 In order to comply with such an order, the Crown could be 
86. Sherrin, supra note 51 at 279-91. Te Supreme Court of Canada has found that sentencing 
judges could reduce an ofender’s sentence in compensation for a Charter breach if that 
breach related to the circumstances of the ofence or the ofender. See R v Nasogaluak, 2010 
SCC 6 [Nasogaluak]. Interestingly, some courts, particularly in British Columbia, have 
granted sentence reductions for delay short of a section 11(b) violation pre-Jordan. See: 
R v Purchase, 2012 BCSC 208 at paras 164-66; R v Panousis, 2002 ABQB 1109 at para 53; 
R v Vroegop, 2012 BCPC 484 at para 28; R v E (KV), 2013 BCCA 521 at para 30. 
87. See also Sonja B Starr, “Sentence Reduction as a Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct” 
(2009) 97 Geo LJ 1509. 
88. Truth in Sentencing Act, SC 2009, c 29; R v Summers, 2014 SCC 26. See Nasogaluak, supra
note 89 at paras 63-64: “Te judge must impose sentences respecting statutory minimums 
and other provisions which prohibit certain forms of sentence in the case of specifc ofences.” 
However, “I do not foreclose, but do not need to address in this case, the possibility that, 
in some exceptional cases, sentence reduction outside statutory limits, under s 24(1) of the 
Charter, may be the sole efective remedy for some particularly egregious form of misconduct 
by state agents in relation to the ofence and to the ofender.” See also R v Donnelly, supra
note 74 at para 160, in which Justice Watt found “the trial judge erred in invoking s 24(1) of 
the Charter to impose a sentence outside statutory limits for the ofence of which Donnelly 
was convicted.” R v Ferguson, 2008 SCC 6 forecloses the use of constitutional exemptions. 
See also Hill & Tatum, supra note 51 at 57. 
89. Sherrin, supra note 51 at 279-91. 
90. Mills, supra note 4 at para 298; Senate Report, supra note 46 at 38. 












required to re-prioritize cases, curtail witness lists, or proceed on only some of the 
charges on a given indictment. 
In terms of structure, the best remedial framework for section 11(b) violations 
would function as follows. Te court would determine whether the delay in a 
given case is reasonable under the Jordan framework. If the delay is unreasonable, 
the court would then determine whether a stay ought to be entered with reference 
to three factors: (1) the seriousness of the violation; (2) demonstrable prejudice 
to the defendant’s liberty, security of the person, and fair trial interests; and (3) 
society’s interest in a trial on its merits. 
Borrowing from existing section 24(1) jurisprudence, a stay would be 
appropriate where a fair trial is no longer possible or, having weighed the 
seriousness and impact of the violation against society’s interest in a trial on its 
merits, the trial judge fnds it “would be harmful to the integrity of the justice 
system” to proceed to trial.91 Whether any alternative remedies are capable of 
redressing the specifc prejudice sufered by the defendant would be crucial to 
both determinations.92 Stays would likely be less frequent than they are currently, 
but more common than under the abuse of process regime due to the long 
history of assiduously guarding defendants’ section 11(b) rights and the fact that 
prejudice arising from unreasonable delay is irremediable by simply ordering 
a new trial.93 In cases where a stay is not entered, the court would redress to 
the fullest extent possible the specifc prejudice to each of the defendant’s three 
Charter-protected interests through the remedies outlined above. Some remedies 
would be implemented before or at trial, such as evidentiary rulings and release 
91. Te frst branch would be analogous to the “main category” of the abuse of process regime: 
Babos, supra note 23 at para 31; Gowdy, supra note 29 at para 57. While the abuse of process 
doctrine may be informative when structuring a remedial framework for s 11(b) violations, 
Justice Lamer was careful to distinguish the two in Mills: 
Te section is concerned not with abuse of process but with abusive process. Te Crown’s 
motives, whatever they may be, do not render a reasonable delay unreasonable nor can they 
transform an unreasonable delay into a reasonable lapse of time. Tus, whether the delay is the 
result of malice, negligence or inadvertence is of little import, the remedy being in all cases at 
least a stay, except, of course, when considering additional remedies, such as damages. 
Supra note 4 at para 189. Te second branch would be analogous to the “residual category” 
of the abuse of process regime: Babos, supra note 23 at para 35. 
92. Gowdy, supra note 29 at para 61. 
93. Babos, supra note 23 at paras 46-47. Given the strong language in Jordan, s 11(b) is likely 
a right that “strikes at the very heart of the criminal justice system” and would likely be 
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orders, while others would be implemented after trial, such as sentence reductions 
and cost awards. 
What emerges is an interest balancing remedial framework that allows 
for alternative remedies. Tis regime would yield a host of ancillary benefts. 
For example, as occurs in exclusion of evidence cases, the Crown would 
actually concede some section 11(b) violations and confne the application to a 
determination of the appropriate remedy. Tis would further enhance Jordan’s
stated goals of clarity and simplicity and mitigate the toll on judicial resources 
inherent in implementing a remedial framework. 
Such a regime would also enhance public confdence in the administration of 
justice. As the Jordan majority noted, “the Canadian public expects their criminal 
justice system to bring accused persons to trial expeditiously.”94 However, in the 
current absence of any consideration of prejudice, the seriousness of the violation, 
or the gravity of the ofence, Canadians may justifably feel concerned that our 
current regime is purposefully ignorant of factors that are intuitively relevant 
to, if not dispositive of, the issue of delay.95 If the Court is prepared to speak 
on behalf of the Canadian public’s expectations, then it should recognize that 
Canadians likely do not expect the reductive outcomes foreseeably fowing from 
the confuence of its decisions in Jordan and Rahey.96 Indeed, the analogous Grant 
test is specifcally crafted to safeguard public confdence in the administration of 
justice by virtue of the wording of section 24(2). 
An interest balancing remedial framework that allows for alternative 
remedies would also allow trial judges to address local and societal issues by 
amplifying society’s interest in either a trial on its merits or in disassociating 
the administration of justice from abusive or systemic delay-causing conduct. 
For example, trial judges would be given the discretion to attach more weight 
to systemic institutional delay in their jurisdiction or, as suggested by the 
dissent in Jordan, attach less weight to “institutional delay that is attributable to 
exceptional and temporary conditions in the justice system” where the state has 
94. Jordan, ibid at para 2. 
95. Public and political outrage followed news that a frst-degree murder charge had been 
stayed in Picard. At least in the eyes of the deceased’s family, the Court of Appeal’s 
decision to overturn the trial decision restored some faith in the justice system, though 
they remain disillusioned. See Sean Fine, “Couple’s faith in Canadian justice system lost, 
despite conviction in son’s murder,” Te Globe and Mail (16 October 2018), online: <www. 
theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-couples-faith-in-canadian-justice-system-lost-despite-
conviction-in> [perma.cc/T9GQ-36QE]. 
96. Jordan, supra note 1 at para 2. 











made reasonable eforts to alleviate those conditions.97 Trial judges could give 
efect to society’s interest in a trial on its merits not only because the ofence 
charged is grave, but because it represents a persistent or pressing societal ill, such 
as frearms ofences, sexual ofences involving children, and racially motivated 
violence.98 In this way, section 11(b) could be refned from a blunt instrument to 
a surgical tool for denouncing and remedying the existing culture of complacency 
towards delay without compromising the bright-line defnition of reasonableness 
conferred in Jordan. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In Jordan, the Court demonstrated that it will not shy away from jurisprudential 
reform in its efort to correct the section 11(b) course. Tis intrepid spirit should 
persist with a re-evaluation of the automatic stay rule. While the automatic 
stay rule has arguably always been misguided, in conjunction with the Jordan
framework, it precludes consideration of individual and societal interests that 
are clearly relevant to the issue of delay and requires trial judges to ignore the 
actual seriousness of a given infringement. As a result, it stands to undermine 
confdence in the administration of justice, the rights of accused persons, and the 
Jordan framework itself. 
Simultaneously, however, Jordan represents an opportunity. By removing 
remedial concerns from the section 11(b) analysis, the Court has laid the 
foundation for an interest balancing remedial framework. By recognizing trial 
judges’ frustration with the automatic stay rule, it has foreshadowed a return to 
the corrective principles of section 24(1). Once Jordan has exacted its sea change 
on the administration of justice, both of these developments should be embraced, 
and nuance and fexibility should be re-introduced into our section 11(b) regime. 
Te Court has only partially corrected the section 11(b) course; it is time to 
untether the wheel and re-chart our approach to remedy as well. 
A signifcant period of time elapsed from when this paper was frst submitted until 
its publication. During that time several decisions were released which would have 
merited discussion. Perhaps most important was R v Charley by the Ontario Court 
97. Ibid at para 209. 
98. See Senate Report, supra note 46 at 39. Te gravity of sexual ofences involving children were 
specifcally stressed by the Standing Senate Committee as crucial to maintaining confdence 
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of Appeal.99 Paragraphs 106-14 may be seen as pertinent, especially paragraph 107 
wherein the court noted, “[i]t is settled law, at least in respect of s. 11(b) breaches that 
occur prior to verdict, that a stay of proceedings is the only available remedy… . In his 
factum, Crown counsel suggests that Rahey and the subsequent line of authority from 
the Supreme Court of Canada has been heavily criticized and is ripe for reconsideration 
after Jordan.” 100 At paragraph 27 of Charley it was noted, “[t]he [trial] Crown did 
not argue that there were any other remedies available under s. 24(1) of the Charter 
for a breach of s. 11(b).” 101 
99. [2019] OJ No 4693. 
100. Ibid at para 107. 
101. Ibid at para 27. 
